thằng ngốc

A stupid person; an idiot; a fool.

⚠ Học sinh có thể dùng nhầm từ này cho người bị khuyết tật trí tuệ; trong ngữ cảnh y khoa, từ này không còn được dùng và có thể gây xúc phạm nặng nề.

ℹ Đây là từ mang sắc thái miệt thị mạnh, không nên dùng trong giao tiếp lịch sự hoặc môi trường chuyên nghiệp.

• Mr. Borelli, Mr. Borelli, with all due respect, you're such a fantastic moron it's terrifying.
• He is such a moron for believing that empty promise.Anh ta đúng là một thằng ngốc khi tin vào lời hứa suông đó.

người thiểu năng trí tuệ

A person of mild mental subnormality in the former classification of mental retardation, having an intelligence quotient of 50–70.

ℹ Đây là một thuật ngữ y học đã lỗi thời và hiện nay được coi là thiếu tôn trọng hoặc gây xúc phạm nếu dùng trong giao tiếp thông thường.

• In older medical documents, a person of mild mental subnormality was often classified by their IQ score.Trong các tài liệu y khoa cũ, người thiểu năng trí tuệ thường được phân loại dựa trên chỉ số IQ của họ.

hạt đạo đức

A hypothetical particle whose existence and configuration can make a moral judgment true.

ℹ Đây là một thuật ngữ chuyên môn trong triết học đạo đức, không phải là từ thông dụng để chỉ người ngu ngốc.

• Encouraged by this solution to the puzzle in the case of judgments about our manifest surroundings, one might hope that a similar solution can be offered to the parallel puzzle concerning normative judgments. One example of this solution might be to affirm the existence of what Dworkin calls morons (p. 104)—special moral particles with causal powers—and then to explain why an ability to detect morons tended to promote the reproductive success of ancestors who possessed this ability. The thought is that perhaps an inability to detect these particles led to decreased reproductive success, just as an inability to detect boulders, trees, and lakes did. As his moron terminology suggests, however, Dworkin utterly rejects any solution along these lines. He thinks the idea of morons is absurd (pp. 104-5), and indeed takes the view that normative properties never play a role in our best causal explanations. Moral rightness and wrongness, goodness, normative reasons, value, and so on, in Dworkin's view, are not things with causal powers at all, and it is a misguided test for the existence of these things to ask whether or not they play a role in our best causal explanations (p. 119). As Thomas Nagel has put the point, "Mackie [has argued that] reasons play no role in causal explanations. But it begs the question to assume that this sort of explanatory necessity is the test of reality for values. The claim that certain reasons exist is a normative claim, not a claim about the best causal explanation of anything."²⁵ As we saw earlier, this rejection of the idea that reasons and values are things with causal powers is a distinguishing feature of non-naturalist versions of normative realism in general. I think there is more to be said about this second possible solution to the puzzle than Dworkin's talk of "morons" suggests. Yet in the end, I agree with Dworkin, Nagel, and other non-naturalist realists on this point. Rightness, wrongness, goodness, normative reasons, value, and so on are very different things than trees and boulders, and no plausible causal account will solve the practical/theoretical puzzle. I will not argue for this point here, however; I say more about it elsewhere.²⁶ I mention this second possible solution only to set it aside; in what follows I will assume with Dworkin and other non-naturalist realists that this second solution to the puzzle fails, allowing us to focus on Dworkin's proposed solution.
• Dworkin introduces the concept of morons to argue against the view that moral values have causal powers.Dworkin đưa ra khái niệm hạt đạo đức để phản bác quan điểm cho rằng các giá trị đạo đức có sức mạnh nhân quả.